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ABSTRACT 
 
 The failure of key EU Member States to respect the provi-
sions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) a few years after its 
inception triggered a heated debate on how to reform the frame-
work of fiscal policy coordination in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). This paper analyzes 101 reform proposals pre-
sented by professional academic and non-academic economists 
prior to March 2005, when the Council of the European Union 
adopted a revised version of the SGP. Roughly four different 
schools of thought concerning the reform of the SGP are identified. 
In line with the main findings of the political economy literature, 
all four schools of thought share the view that in the absence of 
specific rules fiscal policy would lead to excessive deficits and 
hence affect the conduct of the common monetary policy. However, 
beyond this common denominator, there is no consensus on how 
best to co-ordinate fiscal policy.  
 We present several explanations for the multitude of pro-
posals, the most important being the present lack of a consensus in 
the economics profession concerning the role of fiscal policy. 
Economists hold diverging views on the goals, instruments, effi-
ciency and institutions for fiscal policy-making. This state of affairs 
is in sharp contrast to the case of monetary policy. Also, the euro 
area is the first case where monetary policy-making is centralized 
while fiscal policy-making is decentralized to national govern-
ments.  
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1. ITRODUCTIO
1 
 
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the large 
number of proposals for reforming the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) presented by professional academic 
and non-academic economists in recent years. The 
background for our study is the crisis of the EU fiscal 
framework which led to the suspension of the SGP in 
November 2003 and the adoption of a reformed SGP in 
March 2005. Growing political tensions went along 
with a lively discussion about the main caveats of the 
EU budgetary framework and potential solutions. The 
discussion within political and academic circles gave 
rise to a veritable industry of 'SGP therapists' who pro-
duced a wide range of proposals on how to properly 
implement fiscal policy-making in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
When viewed from an adequate distance, the 
discussion about the SGP can be read as the symptom 
of a more fundamental disagreement. As regards the 
political debate, it could simply be taken to mirror con-
flicts of interest or dynamic inconsistencies which fea-
ture prominently in the political economy literature. 
The disagreement among professional economists has a 
somewhat different connotation. It clearly signals the 
lack of consensus about the proper goals and instru-
                                                 
1 The views expressed here are those of the authors. They do not 
represent the opinion of the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs. The authors have received valuable comments 
from Roel Beetsma, Michael Bergman, Iain Begg, Martin Flodén, 
Dermot Hodson, Jan in't Veld, Roman Kräussl, Ludger Schuknecht, 
Alessandro Turrini, Charles Wyplosz and two anonymous referees. 
The authors also thank seminar participants at the 2006 SNEE 
European Integration Conference, Mölle and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco for suggestions. Research assistance by 
Paolo Biraschi is gratefully acknowledged. 
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ments of fiscal policy, either in a domestic and or in an 
international setting. Even the empirical question about 
the effects of fiscal policy measures on domestic and 
international demand is disputed. There is also a lack of 
agreement concerning the proper institutions for fram-
ing fiscal policy. This state of affairs is in sharp con-
trast to the case of monetary policy, where there is more 
of a consensus about the goals, instruments and institu-
tional framework of monetary policy-making.  
 
The fact that the EMU is a unique construction 
adds to the debate. The euro area is the first monetary 
union in history where a group of independent countries 
devolve their monetary sovereignty to a common cen-
tral bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), while re-
taining domestic control over fiscal policy, thus giving 
economists new turf on which to test their ability to 
present policy proposals. And they have used this op-
portunity amply.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 re-
views the history of the SGP. This survey is crucial to 
understand the economic and political background of 
the many proposals for reform. Section 3 examines 101 
proposals of reform of the SGP using cluster analysis. 
Each proposal is classified according to a number of 
variables such as the main policy objective pursued and 
the proposed degree of policy modification involved. 
Section 4 compares the actual reform of the SGP 
adopted by the Council of the European Union with the 
academic debate reflected in the 101 proposals. Section 
5 offers an explanation of why there are more than one 
hundred proposals on the market for reforming the 
SGP. The final section concludes.  
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2. SAILIG WITH THE SGP: A HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW 
 
The SGP is a rule-based framework for the co-
ordination of national fiscal policies in the EMU. It was 
established to address the risk of negative spillovers 
from the budgetary positions of individual Member 
States into the common monetary policy. It consists of 
(i) a preventive part which requires Member States to 
attain sustainable medium-term budgetary positions, 
and (ii) a corrective part laying out procedural provi-
sion for the correction of an excessive deficit.2  
 
Whether there is a need for a common frame-
work for fiscal policy co-ordination and, if so, how it 
should be designed, has never stopped being debated, 
though the intensity of the debate has ebbed and 
flowed. 
 
2.1. DESIGIG, BUILDIG AD AMIG THE 
SHIP: FROM MAASTRICHT TO A STABILITY 
AD GROWTH PACT 
 
Before the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 
1992, the debate mainly revolved around the question 
whether an optimal currency area was a pre-condition 
for a successful monetary union or whether monetary 
integration itself could drive harmonisation.3 As re-
gards fiscal rules, there was a majority view that restric-
tions on national fiscal policy were necessary. Promi-
nent dissidents include Bean (1992). 
 
                                                 
2 A detailed description of the SGP goes beyond the purpose of this 
paper. A useful reference is Cabral (2001). 
3 See for instance Eichengreen (1991) and De Grauwe and Van-
haverbeke (1991). 
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In the mid-1990s, Germany got cold feet as its 
domestic climate became more hostile to the idea of 
EMU. The Germans’ fear was that once countries had 
passed the convergence tests and entered EMU, their 
incentives to stick to budgetary discipline would evapo-
rate. To persuade Germany to give up the DM, more 
assurance was required that fiscal policies would re-
main sound also inside the EMU, especially on the part 
of members with a history of high inflation, deficits and 
debt. In 1995, the German Minister of Finance Theo 
Waigel proposed a ‘Stability Pact for Europe’ where 
the 3% of GDP deficit objective (one of the conver-
gence criteria for joining the euro) would become a 
firm upper ceiling, sanctions for exceeding the refer-
ence value would be automatic and a new Stability 
Council comprising only participating Member States 
would implement the framework. The end product was 
far less mechanical. The Commission set up a frame-
work that (i) clarified the provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty regarding the excessive deficit procedure, and 
(ii) committed the members of the monetary union to a 
medium-term budgetary objective of 'close to balance 
or in surplus'.  
 
On the basis of 1997 outcomes, 11 countries 
qualified for EMU. The consolidation efforts were con-
siderable, even if some ‘creative accounting’ and other 
one-off measures on the margin also helped bring gov-
ernment deficits under the ceiling. Moreover, 1998 was 
a good year in terms of economic growth creating some 
margin for manoeuvre within the 3% of GDP reference 
value and setting the scene for a good start of the EMU 
on 1 January 1999. 
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2.2. SETTIG SAIL AD EJOYIG FAIR 
WIDS: 1999-FISRT HALF OF 2001  
 
Building on the 1997-98 developments, the 
SGP got off to a smooth virgin voyage. In 1999, the 
first operational year of the SGP, the euro-area Member 
States’ budgetary deficits continued to improve on the 
back of good growth conditions. Figure 1 presents the 
weighted budget balance for the euro area and the pro-
jections made across consecutive generations of stabil-
ity programmes. It shows clearly that on average budget 
deficits in 1999-2000 came out better than planned. For 
1999, the main explanation was the composition of 
economic growth which turned out to be very ‘budget-
friendly’ yielding higher-than-expected tax receipts.4 
The easy sailing with high growth continued in 2000.5 
Eight out of twelve euro-area countries showed budget 
surpluses. 
 
The improvement of headline deficits concealed 
the fact that underlying budgetary positions did not 
change as much. According to the current Commission 
estimates the euro-area cyclically-adjusted budget defi-
cit was close to 2% over the 1997-2000-period and the 
primary cyclically-adjusted balance deteriorated.  
 
In spite of improving headline budget figures, 
some discussion started on how to make the framework 
                                                 
4 A better than foreseen outcome of the 1998 budgets, a reduced 
interest burden and a changeover from ESA79 to ESA95 account-
ing standards played a role. 
5 In 2000, the budget of the euro area as a whole was marginally in 
surplus. However, this included sizeable one-off receipts from the 
sale of Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
licences in several countries; netting out UMTS resulted in a deficit 
of 1 per cent of GDP. 
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binding in good times as well as in bad ones. Some 
commentators, including the Commission, argued that 
it would be better to pay more attention to cyclically-
adjusted budget figures. 
 
Figure 1: General government budget balance of the euro area. 
Budget plans of successive stability programmes vs. outcomes 
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Note: The deficit figure for 2000 excludes UMTS proceeds. 
Sources: National stability programmes and Commission services. 
 
In March 2003, following the November 2002 
Commission Communication ‘Strengthening the co-
ordination of budgetary policies’, the ECOFIN Council 
adopted a report formally changing the status of the cy-
clically-adjusted budget balance from a complementary 
analytical tool to a key element to assess compliance 
with a number of SGP provisions.6 The report consid-
ered that the compliance with the close-to-balance-or-
in-surplus requirement of the SGP should be assessed 
in cyclically-adjusted terms and that countries with a 
                                                 
6 ECOFIN Council Report 6877/03 of 7 March 2003, endorsed by 
the European Council of March 21-22 March 2003. 
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deficit must improve their cyclically-adjusted budget 
position and, in the case of euro area countries, by a 
minimum annual reduction of 0.5% of GDP. Unsurpris-
ingly, experience gathered in practice has shown that 
cyclically-adjusted budget balances are frequently re-
vised in view of the uncertainty surrounding real-time 
output gap estimates (see for instance Hughes Hallett et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.3. HITTIG HEAVY WEATHER AD FI-
ALLY RUIG AGROUD: SECOD HALF 
2001-MARCH 2005 
 
Towards the end of spring 2001 a decisive shift 
occurred when the economic cycle took a sudden turn 
for the worse, which give way to a protracted period of 
slow growth. Signs of procedural alarm started to show 
in 2002 as the first steps were taken to implement the 
SGP’s corrective arm. Early that year the Commission 
recommended the Council to issue an early warning to 
Germany and Portugal as their deficits were approach-
ing the 3% of GDP reference value.7 The Council, 
however, decided not to follow the Commission’s rec-
ommendation. This conflict contained already the key 
elements emerging in the forthcoming reform debate: 
the Council versus the Commission, small versus large 
Member States, acting early on indications versus wait-
ing for outcomes. 
 
By autumn 2002, it was clear that both Ger-
many and Portugal would breach the 3% of GDP refer-
ence value; the situation in France was also deteriorat-
ing rapidly. After this, things moved quickly.8 The 
                                                 
7 The early warning is part of the preventive arm of the SGP.   
8 An excessive deficit was established for Portugal in November 
2002 and for Germany in January 2003. France received an ‘early 
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2004 budget proposals showed that Germany and 
France would fail to bring their deficits below the 3% 
of GDP reference value in 2004 as required. At this 
stage the Commission asked the Council to issue a new 
recommendation to the two countries, requesting fur-
ther action on top of that included in the 2004 budgets 
while at the same time postponing the deadline for 
meeting the 3% limit by one year, to 2005, in view of 
the weak economic outlook. However, at the meeting 
on 25 November 2003, the Council decided not adopt 
the recommendations and put the procedure on hold in-
stead. The decision was not unanimous. Most of the 
smaller Member States (incidentally usually fulfilling 
the ‘close to balance’ requirement) voted in favour of 
the Commission’s recommendation but the larger coun-
tries (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) formed a 
blocking minority.  
 
Instead of adopting the formal recommenda-
tions prepared by the Commission, the Council issued 
its own conclusions which were broadly in line with 
what the Commission had requested. However, had the 
Council adopted the Commission’s recommendation 
and France and Germany failed to comply, the next step 
would have been sanctions.  
 
The Commission judged that it could not accept 
the SGP legislation being disregarded and asked the 
European Court of Justice to bring clarity to the proce-
dure. The Court presented its verdict in July 2004 and 
ruled that the Council did not have the right to sidestep 
                                                                                            
warning’ in January 2003 and an excessive deficit was deemed to 
exist in June that year. All three countries were told by the Council 
to take action to bring their deficits below the 3% threshold (in 
2003 for Portugal and in 2004 for Germany and France). Germany 
did take action and presented budget measures of around 1% of 
GDP in spring 2003. 
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the legal procedures. The clarification of the legal 
status of the SGP by the European Court of Justice 
cleared the way for a broader, formal reform debate. On 
3 September 2004, the Commission presented a com-
munication on how to improve the SGP. On this basis 
and after long discussions, the European Council was 
able to endorse an agreement on 20 March 2005.  
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL AALYSIS 
 
3.1. THE SET OF PROPOSALS TO BE AA-
LYZED 
 
As of 20 March 2005, the cut-off date of our 
survey, we collected a sample of 101 reform proposals 
made available in the English language by professional 
academic and non-academic economists in and outside 
Europe. Proposals advanced by policy-makers or non-
economists were not considered because our focus is on 
the economic profession’s point of view. The complete 
list of reform proposals, presented in alphabetic order, 
is displayed in the Annex. 
 
While our selection may still not cover the en-
tire literature on the subject, we are convinced that we 
have identified a significant and representative part.9 
More proposals are likely to have emerged after our 
cut-off date of March 2005. In particular, the report of 
the European Council of 20 March 2005 mapping out 
                                                 
9 We have taken great pains to identify proposals to reform the 
SGP, searching the web and working paper sites of various organi-
zations and universities. One limitation is language as we have 
ruled out non-English contributions. However, we believe that 
original proposals of reform made in other languages than English 
would have found their way into the English language sooner or 
later. Thus, we do not regard our focus on English as a major prob-
lem. 
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the reformed SGP triggered a new wave of assessments 
and proposals from the economics profession. How-
ever, we believe that cutting the sample off with the ar-
rival of the new Pact gives us a sufficiently large and 
diverse collection of reform proposals. 
Predictably, many proposals in our collection 
share some similarities regarding both the analysis and 
the policy conclusions. But each proposal also exhibits 
some distinctive features. To avoid getting bogged 
down in a tedious descriptive analysis of the mass of 
proposals, we have characterised each proposal by a set 
of eleven variables, referring to the background of the 
authors and the type of proposals they make. The data 
base obtained in this way lends itself to basic multivari-
ate statistical analysis. 
 
In terms of the economic content of the propos-
als, two variables are crucial: (i) the main economic 
policy objective of the SGP advocated by the authors, 
and (ii) the suggested modification of the current insti-
tutional setup. Concerning the policy objective, we dis-
tinguish between seven different categories: (1) short-
term stabilisation, (2) short-term budgetary discipline, 
(3) long-run sustainability, (4) optimal policy mix, (5) 
economic growth, (6) combinations of policy aims, and 
finally as a separate entity those proposals arguing that 
(7) the SGP serves no purpose, and thus that a market 
solution would be superior. Of course, there are trade-
offs and/or complementarities across these main goals. 
However, for the purpose of our analysis we have iden-
tified what we view as the main aim of the various rec-
ommendations.  
 
With regard to the suggested modifications of 
the SGP, we choose six different categories for classi-
fying the proposals. These categories are ranked ac-
cording to the degree of modification ranging from (0) 
for 
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Table 1. Characterising variables of the reforms 
proposals and their frequency distribution 
aim (nominal variable): What is the aim of the policy proposal? 
Category 
(value) 
Short-
term sta-
bilisation 
(1) 
Short-
term 
budgetary 
discipline 
(2) 
Long-run 
sustainabil-
ity (3) 
Opti-
mal 
policy 
mix (4) 
No. of pa-
pers: 
19 11 19 13 
Category 
(value) 
Growth 
(5) 
Combina-
tion (6) 
Market so-
lution (7) 
 
No.papers: 12 19 8  
model (nominal variable): Does the proposal include a theoreti-
cal model? 
Category 
(value) 
Yes (0) No (1)   
No. papers: 27 71   
empir (nominal variable): Does the proposal include empirical 
analyses? 
Category 
(value) 
Yes (0) No (1)   
No. papers: 45 56   
modif (ordinal variable): What is the proposed degree of modi-
fication? 
Category 
(value) 
No modi-
fication (0) 
Reinter-
pretation 
of the Pact 
(1) 
Changes 
in rules 
and pro-
cedures 
(2) 
Change
s in 
institu-
tions 
(3) 
No. papers: 5 4 53 11 
Category 
(value) 
Changes in 
rules and 
institutions 
(4) 
Abolish 
the Pact 
and go for 
alterna-
tives (5) 
  
No. papers: 11 17   
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Table 1 continued 
nprop (cardinal value): How many proposals are being put for-
ward? 
No. of pro-
posals (and 
papers) 
1 prop (77); 2 prop (15); 3 prop (7); 4 prop (1); 
7 prop (1) 
welf (nominal variable) Does the paper follow a welfare or po-
litical economy approach? 
Category 
(value) 
Welfare 
(0) 
Political 
Economy 
(1) 
Both (2)  
No.papers: 52 32 17  
date (cardinal variable) Distance between date of publication 
and  Nov. 2003 in months 
No. propos-
als/ papers 
More than 2 years (11); Less than 2, more than 1 
(10); Less than 1 year (32); After (48) 
large (nominal variable) Do the authors originate from a large 
or a small country? 
Category 
(value) 
Large (0) Small (1) Both (2)  
No. papers: 76 20 5  
euro (nominal variable) Do the authors originate from a euro or 
a non-euro area country?  
Category 
(value) 
Yes (0) No (1) Both (2)  
No. papers: 64 27 10  
eur (nominal variable) Do the authors originate from a EU or a 
non-EU area country? 
Category 
(value) 
Yes (0) No (1) Both (2)  
No. papers: 83 11 7  
acad (nominal variable) Are the authors academics? 
Category 
(value) 
Yes (0) No (1) Both (2)  
No. papers: 61 27 13  
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‘no modification’ to (5) for ‘abolish the SGP and go for 
alternatives’. A detailed description of the variables 
characterising each proposal is provided in Table 1.10  
 
 The main aim of the quantitative analysis of the 
101 proposals is to examine the degree of consensus or 
the lack of it among professional economists concern-
ing the SGP. Several questions spring to mind. How 
dispersed are the views about the objectives of the 
SGP? Have views changed over time? How important 
are welfare considerations vis-à-vis considerations of 
political economy? Are there significant differences be-
tween the proposals of academic and non-academic 
economists? Do views differ between contribution from 
euro-area countries and non-euro-area countries? Does 
the size of the proposal-maker’s country matter?  
 
The overview of the 101 SGP proposals, dis-
played in Table 1, shows the distribution across the 
characterising variables. The geographical distribution 
is very EU-centred: around 80% of the proposals stem 
from European economists, of which less than one 
fourth were from non-euro-area countries. Few propos-
als originate from the 'new' Member States. One reason 
for this is certainly that accession took place in May 
2004, less than one year before the Council adopted the 
report underpinning the reform of the SGP. The low 
number of proposals from the 'new' Member States may 
also be due to a lack of ownership. 
 
More than half of the proposals were produced 
by academics. Nevertheless, the fact that around one 
fourth of the proposals were advanced by non-
                                                 
10 The full classification of the 101 reform proposals based on the 
characterising variables in Table 1 can be found in Annex 2 of the 
European Commission Working Paper No. 267 of December 2006.  
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academics brings out the political prominence of the 
SGP.  
 
The overview in Table 1 also reveals the ab-
sence of a clear majority position on one key element of 
the EU fiscal framework. The 101 proposals are widely 
spread across the variable capturing the main aim of the 
SGP as identified by the author of the proposal.  
 
Concerning the concrete measures on how to re-
form the SGP, about half of the proposals argue that 
changes in rules and procedures within the existing 
framework are sufficient to improve budgetary surveil-
lance. This essentially matches the actual outcome of 
the SGP reform debate as embodied in the Council re-
port of 20 March 2005. However, a significant number 
of the proposals advocate a more radical break, includ-
ing changes to the institutional setup or entirely new 
institutions. On the other hand, a small number of 
economists are of the opinion that the SGP needs no 
change.11  
 
The time dimension is an important aspect. As 
shown in Table 1, the reform debate attracted an in-
creasing number of economists as November 2003 
drew closer and kept its sustained momentum in the 
seventeen months period up to April 2005, reflecting 
the topical and politically pressing nature of the issue. 
Around one third of the proposals were advanced in the 
twelve months preceding the Council's decision not to 
step up the excessive deficit procedure for Germany 
and France and close to 50% in the seventeen months 
                                                 
11 Clearly, this distribution may not be genuinely representative for 
the entire population. We cannot rule a out a selection bias in the 
sense that economists who see no need to change the SGP may 
have been less inclined to participate in the discussion than others. 
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period leading to the actual reform of the SGP in early 
2005. This corresponds to an average output of 2.7 pro-
posals per month. Up until November 2003, the debate 
was mostly sustained by economists from academia. By 
November 2003 around 60% of all academics in our 
samples had already advanced proposals. Conversely, 
the bulk of the non-academic economists started to get 
involved only after the SGP crisis had become acute, 
i.e. after November 2003.  
 
At a very early stage, i.e. at the time of the 
Maastricht agreement, the academic discussion on the 
fiscal framework of the EMU was not particularly ani-
mated, though there were some early contributions, for 
example Buiter et al. (1993). Most attention had natu-
rally been given to the proper conditions for member-
ship. Among the 101 proposals, those contributions re-
lating to alternative frameworks, such as market solu-
tions, generally surfaced at this stage. 
 
As regards the proposed degree of modification 
to the old SGP, the reform proposals tended to con-
verge towards a clear majority view as the debate un-
folded. In the very early stages, there was a sharper di-
vision of views with (i) a still relatively large share of 
proposals that did not see any need for reform and (ii) a 
relatively large group favouring radical changes to the 
SGP. The gap narrowed over time as an increasing 
share came round to the view that there was a need to 
adjust the existing rules of the SGP. At the same time, 
questions of political economy started to gain ground 
over welfare considerations. This probably reflected the 
experience of the stalemate between the Council and 
the Commission, which highlighted the institutional 
and credibility problems of the existing framework. 
 
 
3.2. CLUSTER AALYSIS 
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Cluster analysis is a useful exploratory statisti-
cal tool for organising data into groups of related ob-
servations such that those within a specific group are 
more similar to each other than they are to those in 
other groups. Since no objective criteria for choosing 
the ‘optimal’ number of clusters exist, we proceeded on 
a tentative basis by successively increasing the number 
of clusters, starting with two. This approach reveals 
four relatively stable groups across different types of 
clustering methods.12 All clusters beyond four con-
tained only a limited number of proposals and hence 
did not contain enough information to qualify as a 
meaningful and distinct group. By contrast, less than 
four clusters were not enough to disclose differences 
across some of the variables characterising the 101 pro-
posals.  
 
The distribution of the characterising variables 
of the 101 proposals across the four clusters as well as 
across the characterising variables is presented in Table 
2. It must be stressed that the four clusters do not form 
homogenous groups of economists in terms of the char-
acterising variables. The lines of demarcation are rather 
fuzzy. For some variables the differences across the 
groups are not statistically significant. However, the 
four clusters reveal sufficiently distinct patterns that 
give rise to sufficiently distinct and informative groups 
of proposal. Overall, the four groups chiefly serve illus-
trative purposes and are not meant to indicate that pro-
posals within groups have a unique profile. Keeping 
this qualification in mind, the four groups identified in 
our cluster analysis and presented ‘in order of appear-
ance’ can be characterised as follows.  
                                                 
12 We used a hierarchic technique with chi-square as measure of 
distance and Ward's method for grouping cases into clusters. 
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The first group, which could be referred to as 
disenchanted reformers, includes 31 contributions from 
professional economists who hold very critical views 
about either the general utility or the effectiveness of 
the SGP or both. The group includes the largest number 
of proposals suggesting either relatively incisive re- 
 
Table 2. Frequency distribution across clusters and 
characteristics of the reform proposals 
Disenchanted Reformers = DR   
Defenders of fiscal discipline = DFD 
Advocates of economic growth = AEG 
Supporters of long-term sustainability = SLTS 
Cluster DR DFD AEG SLTS Σ 
No. of 
Papers 
31  19  32  19  10
1 
 No
. 
% No
. 
% No
. 
% N
o. 
%  
Aim:
 
1 
3 10 6 31 5 15 5 26 19 
 
2 
5 16 4 21 1 3 1 5 11 
 
3 
5 16 2 11 5 16 7 37 19 
 
4 
4 13 2 11 7 22 0 0 13 
 
5 
4 13 1 5 5 16 2 10 12 
 
6 
5 16 4 21 7 22 3 16 19 
 
7 
5 16 0 0 2 6 1 5 8 
Model:    
no 
25 81 9 47 29 91 11 58 74 
 
Yes 
6 19 10 53 3 9 8 42 27 
Empir:    
no 
25 81 6 32 10 31 15 79 56 
 
Yes 
6 19 13 68 22 69 4 21 45 
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Table 2 continued 
Cluster DR DFD AEG SLTS Σ 
 No % No % No % N
o. 
%  
Modif:
0 
1 3 1 5 2 6 1 5 5 
1 3 10 0 0 1 3 0 0 4 
2 15 48 9 47 19 59 10 53 53 
3 3 10 4 21 3 10 1 5 11 
4 3 10 3 16 2 6 3 16 11 
5 6 19 2 11 5 16 4 21 17 
nprop:
1 
28 90 16 84 23 72 10 53 77 
2 0 0 1 5 6 19 8 42 15 
3 3 10 2 11 2 6 0 0 7 
>3 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 5 2 
welf: 
PE 
10 32 8 42 9 28 5 26 32 
W 15 49 7 37 20 62 10 53 52 
Both 6 19 4 21 3 10 4 21 17 
Date: 
>72 
2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
  71-25 3 10 3 16 2 6 1 5 9 
  24-13 2 6 4 21 3 9 1 5 10 
  12-0 8 26 7 37 11 35 6 32 32 
   after 16 52 5 26 16 50 11 58 48 
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Table 2 continued 
Cluster DR DFD AEG SLTS Σ 
 No % No % N
o 
% No
. 
%  
large:  S 6 19 4 21 4 13 6 32 20 
 L 22 71 15 79 28 87 11 58 76 
         Both 3 10 0 0 0 0 2 10 5 
euro:    No 11 35 6 32 5 16 5 26 27 
          Yes 16 52 12 63 25 78 11 58 64 
         Both 4 13 1 5 2 6 3 16 10 
EU:    Yes 4 13 4 21 1 3 2 11 11 
           No 23 74 14 74 29 91 17 89 83 
         Both 4 13 1 5 2 6 0 0 6 
acad:  No 10 32 5 26 11 34 1 5 27 
          Yes 18 58 13 69 15 47 15 79 61 
        Both 3 10 1 5 6 19 3 16 13 
 
forms, including major changes to the existing institu-
tional set-up, or its replacement by a totally different 
arrangement. 
 
Part of their reservations about the SGP may be 
explained by the fact that the group includes a relatively 
large share of economists from the US or from non-
euro-area countries, hence not necessarily sharing a 
passion for the idea of a common currency or the re-
lated common fiscal framework. However, the euro-
area economists in the group also hold fairly critical 
and sometimes disillusioned views. A further distin-
guishing feature of the disenchanted reformers is that 
they seem to have relatively clear ideas. More than 90% 
of the papers presented by the disenchanted reformers 
advance only one suggestion about how to 'cure' the 
Pact. Multiple reform proposals are much more com-
mon in the other three groups. 
 
The average date of publication suggests a rela-
tively early entry into the reform debate, around 13-14 
months prior to November 2003. However, the propos-
als are widely distributed across time, including a num-
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ber of very early papers, published well before any 
signs of SGP weakness had appeared on the horizon, as 
well as a number of very late works released after No-
vember 2003. The common cement in this group is the 
view that fiscal discipline should not and cannot be the 
only scope of the SGP. Consequently, other policy 
aims, in particular short-term stabilisation, are advo-
cated as well. Prominent representatives of the first 
group are Alesina (2001), Uhlig (2002), Calmfors 
(2003) and Tanzi (2004). 
 
Tanzi (2004) is among those who show sympa-
thy for the idea that fiscal policy coordination in a 
monetary union could be left to market forces, i.e. to 
the decisions of rating agencies. Such an approach does 
not necessarily follow from a religious belief in market 
forces but from the conclusion that all fiscal rules are of 
little help unless they are totally and constitutionally 
binding, which in Tanzi's view is rarely the case. 
 
Uhlig (2002) also questions the credibility of 
the EU fiscal framework, in particular the credibility of 
the sanctions to be imposed on countries which violate 
the obligations of the SGP. However, unlike Tanzi 
(2004), he proposes to strengthen the framework by re-
placing the discretionary rule of the ECOFIN Council 
by (i) automatic rules and (ii) the possibility for any 
European citizen to take the EU to court and demand 
the imposition of penalty payments. 
 
Calmfors (2003) is a prominent representative 
of those who fully acknowledge the importance of fis-
cal rules as means to enhance fiscal discipline but who 
also point out that the SGP may increase output volatil-
ity because it hampers stabilisation efforts in down-
swings and does not provide sufficiently strong incen-
tives to consolidate public finances in economic good 
times. Against this backdrop, he advocates modifica-
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tions which allow the automatic stabilisers to operate 
fully and provide sufficient leeway for discretionary 
fiscal policy actions especially in the wake of large 
idiosyncratic shocks or large common shocks where 
monetary policy needs to be complemented by fiscal 
policy. 
 
Alesina (2001) argues that EU budgetary sur-
veillance should worry less about the first or second 
decimal of the Member States' deficit figure. In his 
view, the focus should shift towards government ex-
penditure, which had reached levels that rather hamper 
economic growth than improve the distribution of in-
come. 
 
The second group encompasses 19 papers by 
economists who could be called defenders of fiscal dis-
cipline. Most of them entered the scene at the begin-
ning of 2003 when the strain on the SGP became tangi-
ble. The group includes a relatively large share of aca-
demic economists (more than two thirds as compared to 
an overall share of 60%). They are unified by the in-
sight that the set of rules of the old SGP was not suffi-
ciently effective in achieving what they predominantly 
perceive as the main aim of the SGP, notably fiscal dis-
cipline and/or fiscal sustainability. Compared to the 
first group, there is a broader consensus that a common 
fiscal framework as such is necessary and useful. In 
particular, none of the proposals favours a 'market solu-
tion', which highlights their conviction that without any 
institutional mechanism things would be worse. The 
main critique advanced by the defenders of fiscal disci-
pline relates to the design of the old SGP, which they 
think was not instrumental in achieving their favoured 
goal, also because of policy failures. 
 
The proposals advanced by the second group 
are largely based on explicit theoretical models. Very 
524 
 
 
often they involve political economy considerations and 
provide empirical evidence pointing to the lack of 
credibility and enforceability of the old SGP. The pro-
posals predominantly include suggestions for proce-
dural and institutional changes aimed at strengthening 
the SGP and taking into account the incentive struc-
tures of fiscal rules. In particular, the second group in-
cludes most proposals suggesting that fiscal surveil-
lance should be entrusted to new and more independent 
fiscal institutions. Casella (1999), Wyplosz (2002), and 
Eichengreen (2003) are particularly illustrative repre-
sentatives of this group. 
 
Wyplosz (2002) is among the first to elaborate 
on the idea of independent fiscal councils as a solution 
to the fiscal co-ordination problem in EMU. In analogy 
to monetary policy, he essentially proposes to free fis-
cal policy-making from political interference, thereby 
addressing the basic credibility problem of the old SGP, 
i.e. the fact that Member States judge their own policies 
through the Council of the European Union. While en-
dorsing their desirability, Wyplosz (2002) admitted that 
the political feasibility of independent fiscal Councils 
may be limited. Variants on the independent council 
proposal are also made by von Hagen (2002) and Fatás 
et al. (2003), who are also part of the second group. 
 
Eichengreen (2003) proposes to strengthen fis-
cal discipline by extending the scope of the SGP to the 
quality of national fiscal institutions. His suggestion 
draws on the results of the literature showing that na-
tional institutional arrangements are strongly correlated 
with fiscal outcomes. Hence, the idea is to complement 
numerical fiscal rules with a framework that encour-
ages Member States to adopt procedures conducive to 
sound public finances.  
 
525 
 
 
A much more radical proposal is put forward by 
Casella (1999) at an early stage. The idea is to replace 
the rules and procedures of the SGP with a market for 
tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for 
the implementation of fiscal constraints in EMU. Such 
an arrangement is intended to allow flexibility at the 
country level while imposing ceilings for the euro area 
as a whole. However, Casella admitted that the en-
forcement of such a system would be weakened if gov-
ernments maintained control over the system, as they 
probably would negotiate exceptions or ad hoc changes 
in the overall deficit ceiling.  
 
The third group comprises the advocates of 
economic growth, 32 contributions from economists, 
who, on average, entered the reform debate around half 
a year before November 2003. By that time, it was al-
ready clear that neither France nor Germany would take 
sufficient measures to bring their deficits below the 3% 
of GDP reference value within the specified deadlines. 
In addition, most large euro-area economies had been 
experiencing persistent low economic growth. Against 
this backdrop, a considerable number of economists, 
mainly from large euro-area countries, argued that the 
exclusive focus on short-term fiscal discipline of the 
old SGP did not ensure a balanced policy mix and pro-
vided insufficient scope for fiscal policy to support 
economic growth. The representatives of this group, 
which included a relatively large number of non-
academics, predominantly based their analysis on wel-
fare considerations, arguing that putting more weight 
on economic growth rather than on fiscal discipline 
would be welfare-enhancing. Political economy consid-
erations were given only minor importance or left out 
of the discussion. This is also why their reform propos-
als do not aim for a major modification of the institu-
tional setup of the SGP. The preferred option is a 
change in existing rules and procedures. Particularly 
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illustrative examples of the third group are Bofinger 
(2003), Fitoussi (2002) and Mathieu and Sterdyniak 
(2003). 
 
Bofinger (2003) presents one of the most un-
compromising proposals prioritising economic growth. 
He advocates a benchmark system for best practices of 
fiscal policy that contributes to economic growth and 
employment.  
 
The proposals put forward by Fitoussi (2002) 
are less radical but motivated by the idea that fiscal 
rules should be state-dependent, i.e. should adjust to 
prevailing economic conditions or allow more leeway 
to react to changing economic conditions. In concrete 
terms, Fitoussi (2002) argues that the deficit rule 
should be replaced by a debt rule which, in contrast to a 
medium-term target of close-to-balance or in surplus in 
the old SGP, would allow Member States to run a defi-
cit in the medium term. Fitoussi's (2002) second sug-
gestion is to allow for the 'golden rule', which would 
provide more leeway for 'growth-enhancing' public in-
vestment. 
 
Mathieu and Sterdyniak (2003) argue against 
the desirability of supranational economic policy co-
ordination as a whole. In their view, surveillance of 
economic policy should be 'subordinated to the na-
tional policy prerogative of managing the production-
inflation trade-off'. The Commission and the Council 
should only act if spillover effects effectively endanger 
the inflation target for the euro area as a whole.  
 
The authors of the 19 contributions in the 
fourth group could properly be characterised as sup-
porters of long-term sustainability. On average, they 
mobilised shortly before or after November 2003 and 
host the largest share of academics as well as a rela-
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tively large share of economists from small European 
countries. The common denominator emerging from 
their proposals is the view that fiscal rules should focus 
on the long-term sustainability of public finances, 
rather than imposing annual deficit targets. Their pro-
posals are mostly based on the argument that putting 
more emphasis on long-run sustainability within the 
set-up of the SGP provides additional leeway for short-
term stabilisation policy and growth-oriented economic 
policies, without jeopardising fiscal discipline.  
 
Two elements distinguish the fourth group from 
the third; one of degree, the other more of substance. In 
a virtual hierarchy of aims, the economists from the 
fourth group would put more weight on the fiscal sta-
bility aspect of the SGP than on economic growth. 
Moreover, the supporters of long-term sustainability 
show a more pragmatic or differentiated approach than 
the third group. This is evidenced by the fact that on 
average they put forward almost two proposals per pa-
per or publication. Prominent representatives of the 
fourth group are Beetsma and Debrun (2003), Calmfors 
and Corsetti (2004) and Pisani-Ferry (2002). 
 
Pisani-Ferry (2002) recognises a strong need for 
fiscal discipline in EMU but concludes that the focus 
on the deficit in the SGP is too narrow; the debt should 
be given more prominence. His proposal is to shift 
away from an annual assessment of deficit figures to a 
medium-term-oriented approach monitoring compre-
hensive public finance accounts that allow the potential 
impact of off-balance-sheet liabilities to be assessed. 
 
Beetsma and Debrun (2003) argue that a strict 
implementation of the SGP may hamper structural re-
forms, as they may involve substantial up-front costs 
and thus sacrifice future growth. Hence, a more flexible 
interpretation of the 3% of GDP deficit threshold of the 
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Treaty is proposed, though subject to the condition that 
the quality of structural reform is assessed by a politi-
cally independent institution, and that structural re-
forms do not affect the long-term sustainability of pub-
lic finances. This last part, the priority of sustainability, 
distinguishes Beetsma and Debrun (2003) from the ad-
vocates of economic growth. 
 
With a view to giving the SGP more legitimacy, 
Calmfors and Corsetti (2004) suggest increasing its 
short-term flexibility on the deficit threshold by giving 
more weight to long-term sustainability. They propose 
to make the deficit ceiling explicitly conditional on the 
debt level, allowing low-debt countries to run larger 
deficits in downswings than high-debt countries. In ad-
dition, like a large number of other proposals across all 
four groups, they see the need to depoliticize the en-
forcement of SGP, i.e. to limit the role of the ECOFIN 
Council. 
 
In conclusion, the cluster analysis reveals a 
number of important differences in the way the eco-
nomics profession assessed the old SGP. These differ-
ences reflect a divergence in opinion about fiscal policy 
in general. There is no consensus about the welfare im-
plications of the SGP. One camp would seem to take it 
for granted that the SGP is an economically desirable 
set of rules which needs a more or less comprehensive 
political-economy type of ‘re-engineering’ in order to 
make it function properly. Others hold the view that the 
main problem of the old SGP is its primary policy ob-
jective rather than the political constraints ensuing from 
the institutional and procedural set-up. Yet another 
group believes that the old SGP failed or should be im-
proved on both accounts. 
 
There are also notable differences between 
views held inside and outside the euro area, with the 
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‘outsiders’ being somewhat more critical of the various 
aspects of the old SGP. Among the ‘insiders’, econo-
mists from academia exhibit a somewhat stronger con-
viction about the importance of fiscal discipline, 
whereas non-academics seem to be more inclined to 
prioritize other policy goals such as short-term stabili-
zation or economic growth.  
 
4. THE REFORMED SGP: ECLECTIC OR SEC-
TARIA? 
 
While there are clear and frequent interactions 
between economics and politics, it is the privilege of 
policy-makers to draw their own conclusions on pend-
ing economic policy issues. Thus, the intensive reform 
debate on the SGP among professional economists pre-
ceding the actual reform measures may not necessarily 
be a faithful mirror of the policy discussion, let alone of 
the actual steps taken by policy-makers.  
 
This section briefly outlines how many and 
which of the views aired in the economics profession 
eventually made their way into the reformed 2005 SGP. 
The foundations of the new Pact are laid out in the re-
port ‘Improving the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact’ adopted by the ECOFIN Council on 20 
March 2005. The two key parameters that epitomised 
the old Pact, the 3% of GDP reference value for the 
deficit and the 60% of GDP reference value for the 
debt, remained untouched, not least because they are 
part of the EU Treaty, a modification of which would 
have been more difficult to achieve. However, the safe-
guarding of the two reference values went along with a 
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series of modifications of the secondary legislation 
shaping the implementation of the Pact.13  
 
The main modifications aim to improving the 
economic rationale underlying the fiscal rules and their 
implementation. A great many of the 101 reform pro-
posals examined here hold the view that some elements 
of the SGP did not actually make much sense from an 
economic point of view, including the fact that a one-
size-fits-all rule would not sufficiently account for dif-
ferences across countries. The reformed SGP takes ac-
count of this criticism by providing more room for 
country-specific considerations. 
 
As regards the preventive arm of the Pact, the 
medium-term budgetary objective of close to balance or 
in surplus for all countries was replaced by country-
specific medium term targets that take account of the 
economic and fiscal situation of Member States, nota-
bly the current debt to GDP ratio and potential GDP 
growth. Countries with a combination of low debt and 
high potential GDP growth will be allowed to aim for a 
small structural deficit whereas countries with a com-
bination of high debt and low potential growth will still 
be required to move towards a balanced budget or a 
surplus.  
 
The revised SGP also allows greater differentia-
tion across countries concerning the adjustment to-
wards the medium-term objective. The annual adjust-
ment can be modulated depending on prevailing or ex-
pected economic conditions.  
 
                                                 
13 A detailed overview of the 2005 modifications is presented in 
European Commission (2005). 
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As regards the corrective arm of the reformed 
SGP, country-specific conditions are now given more 
importance in the excessive deficit procedure. In par-
ticular, the procedure is no longer linear. It allows for 
the repetition of certain steps in the light of adverse 
economic events specific to the Member State. The new 
SGP also modifies the definition of a severe economic 
downturn which can make the breach of the 3% of 
GDP threshold exceptional. Instead of an annual fall of 
real GDP by at least 2%, which has never been ob-
served in any euro area country since the SGP entered 
into force, the new SGP refers to a negative growth rate 
or the output loss accumulated during a protracted pe-
riod of very low growth relative to potential. This too 
will require a country-specific assessment. 
 
The reform of the SGP pays somewhat less at-
tention to the role of EU procedures and institutions, an 
aspect which featured prominently in the reform debate 
among professional economists. A significant part of 
the economic profession linked the lack of enforcement 
to weaknesses in the governance structure of the EU 
fiscal surveillance, notably the fact that large countries 
in breach of the SGP had a high degree of leverage in 
the Council. Similarly, the Commission’s position was 
assessed to be too weak vis-à-vis the Council to effec-
tively live up to its role of Guardian of the Treaty.  
 
Against this backdrop, a number of reform pro-
posals concluded that enforcement should be improved 
by strengthening the institutions and procedures at both 
the European and the national level. This view is only 
marginally reflected in the reformed SGP. It is true that, 
unlike the old Pact, it gives the Commission the so for 
untested possibility to directly issue policy advice to 
Member States via its preventive arm without the ap-
proval of the Council. However, no changes were made 
to the governance of its corrective arm. Moreover, fis-
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cal governance at the national level is addressed only 
very cursorily, by stating that national institutions could 
play a more prominent role in budgetary surveillance.  
 
In terms of the four broad groups of economists 
identified in the previous section, the changes incorpo-
rated in the new SGP in March 2005 appear to be most 
in line with the views of the advocates of economic 
growth and to some extent with the views of the disen-
chanted reformers. Nevertheless, some of the innova-
tions of the reformed SGP, specifically the country-
specific medium-term budgetary objectives that may 
differ from close to balance or in surplus depending on 
debt and growth performance, reflect ideas put forward 
by the supporters of long-term sustainability. Only the 
defenders of fiscal discipline seem to have had little 
impact on the outcome of the actual reform process. 
 
5. WHY SO MAY PROPOSALS? 
 
In our view, several, at least seven, factors con-
tribute to the multiplicity of reform proposals. They are 
highly interrelated – in particular the first three factors 
discussed below. 
 
1. The crisis of the SGP: One of the main rea-
sons is, of course, the crisis of the SGP in 2003-2005. 
The Pact came under heavy criticism due to the diffi-
culties of several Member States in living up to the 
rules. As the Pact did not deliver the fiscal performance 
it was supposed to, this created incentives to produce 
recommendations for reforms.  
 
Actually, the history of economics as an aca-
demic field demonstrates that current economic prob-
lems create a demand for policy advice, and that the 
economics profession stands ready to supply such ad-
vice. This makes research in economics topical and 
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event-driven, in particular in the field of fiscal and 
monetary policy.14 The 101 proposals for reform of the 
SGP are a clear illustration of this pattern.  
 
Our cluster analysis brings out the topicality of 
the policy proposals. It demonstrates that the timing of 
the publication of proposals is closely tied to the degree 
of political tension surrounding the Pact – the greater 
the tension, the more proposals. Although not all of the 
authors refer explicitly to the problems of the SGP as 
the main factor behind their proposals, the majority of 
them are inspired by the problems of implementing the 
Pact.  
 
2. Changing circumstances – from debt to 
growth: Another factor behind the multiplicity is 
changes in the macroeconomic conditions of the euro 
area after the Pact was signed. As described in Section 
2, the SGP was drawn up in the 1990s, when the sharp 
rise in government debt and high inflation during the 
1980s was regarded as the principal common challenge 
for European policy-makers. A major priority on the 
policy agenda in those days was to prevent and reduce 
the debt build-up. This macroeconomic situation as 
well as the prevailing macroeconomic policy view was 
codified in the SGP in 1997.  
 
Since 1997, new macroeconomic issues and 
thus new goals have emerged on the top of the policy 
agenda. Stagnation and lack of dynamism in the euro 
area has triggered an interest in policies promoting 
                                                 
14 See for example Hicks (1967, p. 156): ‘but with monetary theory 
it is more often a particular understanding – an understanding di-
rected towards a particular problem, normally a problem of the time 
at which the work in question was written. So monetary theories 
arise out of monetary disturbances.’ 
534 
 
 
growth, expansion and employment. This has given rise 
to proposals to changes in the Pact to meet these new 
policy challenges. In addition, the fact that these issues 
are not identical across the EU contributes to the pleth-
ora of proposals.  
 
3. Lack of consensus about the role of fiscal 
policy: The most important explanation behind the 
multiplicity of proposals is the lack of consensus about 
the role of fiscal policy in general. Economists are not 
in agreement about the proper goals, instruments and 
institutional framework for fiscal policy-making. After 
the demise of the Keynesian majority view of the 1950s 
and 1960s, several theories have competed in the mar-
ket for ideas. In short, there is no ruling paradigm for 
fiscal policy-making. 
 
This point can be brought out by contrasting the 
state of affairs of fiscal policy with the case of mone-
tary policy. Today, there is a majority view in the eco-
nomics profession on the role of monetary policy, 
roughly consisting of the following building blocks. 
The goal of the modern central banks is a low and sta-
ble rate of inflation, the instrument is changes in short-
term interest rates under the control of the central bank. 
The policy strategy is forward-looking and rule-bound. 
The preferred institutional framework is a central bank 
with substantial independence from the government 
and the ministry of finance but held accountable for its 
actions to a democratic assembly. This philosophy has 
contributed to the acceptance of inflation targeting by 
central banks in many countries since the early 1990s. 
It is also the intellectual foundation of monetary policy-
making in the euro area. 
 
The roots of today’s ruling monetary policy 
paradigm can be traced back to Milton Friedman’s 
seminal address to the American Economic Association 
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in 1968, ‘The role of monetary policy’ – one of the 
most influential article on macroeconomics in the post-
World-War-II period. Friedman (1968) discussed what 
monetary policy can and cannot do. Turning back to 
fiscal policy, no commonly accepted article or treatise 
on ‘The role of fiscal policy’ similar to Friedman’s lo-
cus classicus on monetary policy has survived the test 
of time. One of the last unified accounts of the Keynes-
ian consensus concerning fiscal policy is Blinder and 
Solow (1974). Admittedly, there has been a gradual 
movement away from the belief in short-term fine-
tuning and discretionary actions of the 1950s and 1960s 
to a more rule-bound approach, stressing fiscal disci-
pline, the role of automatic stabilizers and the long-
term sustainability of public finances. Yet, a unified 
framework is still out of sight. 
 
The divergence of views on fiscal policy is best 
illustrated on the basis of three key dimensions of fiscal 
policy-making: goals, instruments and institutions. All 
possible combinations of agreement and disagreement 
along these dimensions are represented in our sample 
of 101 proposals to reform the SGP. The following ex-
amples illustrate the point.  
 
Most obviously, there is a wide dispersion of 
views concerning the main goal of the SGP. In our 
analysis of the 101 proposals, we identified at least 
seven different categories of fiscal policy objectives – 
see Tables 1 and 2. However, even if there is an agree-
ment on goals, views may still diverge strongly con-
cerning the proper instruments and institutions. For in-
stance, across all four groups found in our cluster 
analysis, many proposals agree on the main goal of the 
SGP but draw different conclusions about either the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal policy instruments or the appropri-
ateness of fiscal institutions or both. Specifically, 
among the group of disenchanted reformers, a rela-
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tively large number of economists believe that fiscal 
discipline should be the main aim of the SGP and they 
share this view with the second group, the defenders of 
fiscal discipline. However, there are distinct differences 
concerning the way the agreed goal can or should be 
implemented. Some think that – within an appropriate 
institutional design – fiscal policy-making would be 
conducive to fiscal discipline, while others are more 
sceptical about the possibility of effectively pursuing 
fiscal discipline because, depending on the state of the 
economy, it should be traded off with other goals.  
 
A further element of dissent for a given goal is 
the time frame. A large number of proposals, especially 
those put forward by the defenders of fiscal discipline, 
argue that fiscal discipline should be enforced on a 
yearly basis. Conversely, there are many economists 
among both the disillusioned reformers and the sup-
porters of long-term sustainability maintaining that fis-
cal discipline must be assessed over a longer period. 
 
In many cases, when there is disagreement 
about goals, the proposals still stand on the common 
ground that some improvements or changes in existing 
fiscal institutions would be instrumental in improving 
fiscal performance, and in any case better than going 
for a pure 'market solution'. However, in this context, 
the dissent often refers to the question of whether pol-
icy-makers should be given more or less discretion in 
implementing the rules. Some proposals suggest reli-
ance on independent fiscal authorities (many are to be 
found among the defenders of fiscal discipline and 
some among the supporters of long-term sustainabil-
ity), run by experts rather than by politicians, while oth-
ers call for more flexibility and leeway for national pol-
icy-makers, not least with a view to increasing owner-
ship of the fiscal rules.  
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The existence of these two fundamentally dif-
ferent views, the traditional view assuming welfare-
maximizing policy-makers and the political economy 
view, is evident in very many proposals. These two ap-
proaches give radically different policy recommenda-
tions. The traditionalists tend to support a loosening of 
the Pact, giving more discretionary power to policy-
makers. Economists in the political economy camp tend 
to suggest stronger constraints on policy-makers. The 
debate is basically about constraining or liberating the 
fiscal policy-makers.15 Alternatively, we may talk about 
an optimistic and pessimistic approach to fiscal policy-
making where the optimists (the welfare view) tend to 
believe in the capacity of well-intentioned policy-
makers while the pessimists (the political economy 
view) doubt their intentions as well as their capacity to 
carry out the proper policies. 
 
The picture becomes still more complex when 
we consider that fiscal policy is not solely focused on 
stabilization or fiscal discipline, but also on issues of 
allocation and distribution. This implies that issues of 
trade-offs between ‘fairness’ (distribution) usually 
emerge when fiscal stabilization measures are consid-
ered. This is hardly the case with the ruling monetary 
policy paradigm of today. 
 
4. Lack of empirical evidence: Another reason 
for the multiplicity of proposals is the fact that few au-
thors use empirical evidence concerning the efficacy of 
fiscal policy in support of their proposals. By ignoring 
empirical evidence, this creates more freedom in de-
signing policy recommendations.  
                                                 
15 For an exposition of the theoretical and empirical arguments for 
constraining fiscal policy-makers, see among others Fatás and Mi-
hov (2002) and Wyplosz (2005). 
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The secondary, often neglected, role of econo-
metric evidence among the proposals most likely re-
flects genuine disagreement among economists regard-
ing the actual effects of fiscal policy measures on the 
economy. In short, the optimism about the impact of 
fiscal policy has been in decline since at least the 1970s 
and has now been replaced by pessimism.16 Standard 
estimates of fiscal multipliers range from close to zero 
to about one. The debate about non-Keynesian effects 
of fiscal policy suggests negative multipliers, implying 
that contractionary fiscal measures may be expansion-
ary under certain circumstances.  
 
Solid estimates of the effects of expenditure 
changes, tax changes, and other fiscal measures simply 
do not exist today. This has contributed to the demise 
in the belief of discretionary fiscal policy as an effec-
tive stabilization tool, while the workings of automatic 
stabilizers have simultaneously been assigned a more 
prominent role.17 As there is no common view on the 
empirical effects of fiscal policy, this issue is com-
monly overlooked among the 101 recommendations, 
allowing for a multitude of proposals. 
 
5. A new economic landscape: Another factor 
behind the many proposals is that the institutional 
framework of the SGP is completely new. The euro 
area is the first case in history of a monetary union 
where monetary policy-making is centralized to a single 
authority, the ECB, while fiscal policy-making is de-
                                                 
16 See for example Auerbach (1994), Briotti (2005), De Mello et al. 
(2004) and Hemming et al. (2002).  
17 See for example Brunila et al. (2003), Orphanides (2000), Or-
phanides and Williams (2005) and Silgoner et al. (2003) on the 
effects of stabilization policies. 
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centralized to national governments.18 Economists are 
thus venturing into virgin territory, which allows them 
to hold widely divergent views about the proper map to 
use for navigation.  
 
Concerning this new institutional setting, there 
is no consensus about the proper models to use for ana-
lyzing the spillovers of domestic fiscal policy. Different 
models emphasize different channels for international 
policy dependence, giving rise to different reform pro-
posals concerning policy coordination under EMU.19 
Where a policy proposal is based on a spillover channel 
working through debt build-up, the proposal will tend 
to focus on measures to restrict debt. Where a model 
for demand-side spillovers is adopted, the policy rec-
ommendations will likely focus on deficit rules. Like-
wise, for a model of supply-side dependency, the policy 
reform suggested would stress steps to influence the 
quality of public finance.20 
 
Although EMU is a new construction, the evi-
dence on fiscal federalism dealing with the experience 
of stabilization policies in federal states like Canada, 
Switzerland and the United States may give guidance 
concerning the design of the SGP. However, very few 
of our 101 proposals explicitly refer to the record from 
federal states. There is a surprising lack of interest in 
the literature on fiscal federalism as well as on fiscal 
policy in other monetary unions than the euro area 
among the proposal-makers.  
 
                                                 
18 See the surveys of monetary unions in Bordo and Jonung (2003).  
19 See for example Ardy et al. (2006, chapter 4) for a survey of the 
issues of policy coordination in the EMU. 
20 This point is developed in detail in chapter 4 in Hodson (2005). 
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6. Different country experiences: The macro-
economic situation – its past, present and future – of 
the authors’ home country influences the design of their 
proposals. Thus, the multiplicity of proposals reflects 
the fact that the authors originate from different coun-
tries with different records on stabilization policy, defi-
cits and debt and at different stages of the business cy-
cle and with different growth rates. There is a clear 
small/large country division, where authors from the 
large countries in the centre of the euro area, France, 
Germany and Italy, are more apt to loosen up the Pact 
than authors from small countries. There is also a ten-
dency for more proposals to emanate from countries 
that are not complying with the SGP, as seen from our 
empirical work. The cluster analysis brings out these 
points. 
 
7. Different views on the political constraint – 
what is politically feasible? The sub-optimality of pro-
posals: Another factor behind the multiplicity is the 
likelihood that economists differ in their views on what 
is politically feasible when designing policy advice. 
Thus, they choose to ‘optimize’ their recommendations 
under different constraints. In principle, two econo-
mists may share the same view on what is the first-best 
solution to a specific problem. However, they may di-
verge in opinion when asked to prepare a policy pro-
posal, depending on what they regard as politically fea-
sible.  
 
Of course, we are not able to derive the first-
best solutions held by the authors of the 101 reform 
proposals. Still, we should be aware that many propos-
als may be the outcome of ‘sub-optimal proposals’ or 
second-best thinking, reflecting the authors’ perception 
of what is feasible in terms of reform of the Pact.  
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6. SUMMARY 
 
Our account of 101 proposals to reform the SGP 
shows that a clear majority views fiscal rules as desir-
able. Without such rules, a deficit bias, i.e. a tendency 
by governments to over-borrow and to build up unsus-
tainable fiscal positions in the long run, would emerge. 
In addition and more specifically related to the EMU, 
there is a broad agreement that common supranational 
fiscal rules are necessary to address the risk of spill-
overs from domestic fiscal policies. A framework to 
coordinate fiscal policies is thus seen as instrumental. 
Only a small minority believes that the tendency to 
over-borrow and/or the risk of spillovers can be ade-
quately handled by market forces. Even then, in some 
cases this position is not underpinned by genuine faith 
in the disciplining force of the financial markets but 
rather by the conviction that any policy solution would 
be subject to policy failure. 
 
The broad consensus about the desirability of 
fiscal rules is dissolved and turned into wide disagree-
ment once the actual policy recommendations proposed 
to improve upon the workings of the SGP are examined 
more closely. We identify a number of factors explain-
ing this multitude of proposals. In short, they are not 
based on a common explicit theoretical foundation or 
model, they are not based on a common empirical or 
econometric set of evidence, and they are not aimed at 
reaching the same policy objective(s). We identify at 
least six different goals for fiscal policy. Often the same 
proposal aims at achieving more than one goal at the 
same time. The methodologies adopted in the proposals 
range from narrative, through pure theoretical exer-
cises, to econometric estimates. We conclude that the 
major reason for the multiplicity of reform proposals is 
the lack of common ground as to the role of fiscal pol-
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icy, although other factors also contribute to the wide 
differences among the 101 proposals. 
 
Our results concerning fiscal policy-making in 
the euro area stand in sharp contrast to the debate about 
the common monetary policy for the euro area. There is 
considerable agreement across the economics profes-
sion about the institutional structure of ECB, its inde-
pendence, its objectives and the instruments it should 
use. True, the ECB has been criticized, but the critique 
is in the details, at least so far. The ECB and its mone-
tary strategy appear to have been basically accepted by 
the economic profession.  
 
The marked difference in professional opinion 
concerning monetary and fiscal policy is due to the 
simple fact that there is a commonly accepted view on 
the role of monetary policy but not on the role of fiscal 
policy. As long as the profession is in disagreement 
about the role of fiscal policy, the SGP will be the sub-
ject of reform proposals.  
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